Aburi: The “Sovereign National Conference” That Got Away By Max Siollun maxsiollun@yahoo.com

After Nigeria was dragged to the
brink of the abyss by two military
coups in 1966, its military leaders
met to try to bring the country
back from the brink. The meeting
evolved into perhaps the best
documented constitutional debate
of all time which touched upon
fundamental concepts regarding the
balance of power between the
central government and federating
regions in a federation and
professional soldiers’ outlook to
military coups and seniority. It
was a potential breakthrough
occasion. Between January 5 th
and 7th 1967, the members of
Nigeria's then ruling military junta,
the Supreme Military Council
(SMC), met for the first time at
Aburi in Ghana under the auspices
of the Ghanaian Head of State: Lt-
General Joe Ankrah. Ankrah was
no stranger to coup plots as he
had become Ghana’s first military
Head of State after Ghana’s first
President Kwame Nkrumah was
deposed in a coup while Nkrumah
was abroad visiting China. Ankrah
was later forced to resign in April
1969 after admitting his role in a
bribery scandal. Ankrah had served
in the Congo during the UN peace-
keeping mission there in the early
1960s and it is likely he personally
knew the Nigerian soldiers
(including Ironsi, Fajuyi, Ojukwu
and Gowon) who served in the
same mission. The meeting at
Aburi was the first official meeting
of all members of that SMC.
Following a second bloody army
coup in July 1966, the Military
Governor of the eastern region of
Nigeria: Lt-Colonel 'Emeka' Ojukwu
had refused to attend any SMC
meeting outside the eastern region
of Nigeria due to concerns over his
safety. The massacre of tens of
thousands of Igbos in northern
Nigeria only heightened Ojukwu's
sense of isolation and insecurity. In
turn, Ojukwu's public belligerence
towards the SMC (whom he
suspected of tacitly supporting, or
having a hand in the massacres)
served to antagonise the SMC, who
began to suspect that Ojukwu was
planning the secession of the
eastern region from the rest of
Nigeria.
The fashionable political theory
being bandied about in Nigeria
today is that a "Sovereign National
Conference" (SNC) should be held
to resolve the country’s
constitutional problems and coup
plotting culture. Many do not
realise that Nigeria has already had
half a dozen constitutional debates
- none of which has ever resolved
the nagging problems which have
dogged Nigeria from independence
till today. Nigeria has wasted
billions of Naira on constitutional
debates and constitutions that are
no longer in use, and a future SNC
is unlikely to discuss anything that
has not already been covered in the
previous constitutional debates.
Ironically the best recorded of these
constitutional debates was never
implemented, and Nigeria has been
paying the price since. To plan for
the future Nigeria might do well to
go back into its archives and learn
from the "SNC" which it has
already had.
BETWEEN ONE AMBITIOUS MAN
AND THE REST OF THE COUNTRY
In the months preceding Aburi the
SMC and Ojukwu had engaged in a
war of words with the two sides
trading multiple accusations and
blaming each other for causing or
exacerbating the crisis. The
Military Governor of the north: Lt-
Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina
dismissed Ojukwu's confident and
eloquent public statements on the
crisis as attempts by Ojukwu "to
show how much English he knows" .
As far as Katsina was concerned,
Nigeria's problem was a stand-off
"between one ambitious man and
the rest of the country" .
Throughout the six months
following the coup of July 29 th
1966, Ojukwu repeated his mantra
that "I, as the Military Governor of
the east cannot meet anywhere in
Nigeria where there are northern
troops" . That virtually ruled out an
SMC meeting inside Nigeria's
borders. Ojukwu had even turned
down offers to attend an SMC
meeting on board a British (whom
Ojukwu, and Igbos in general did
not entirely trust) naval ship, and
at Benin, but was finally convinced
to attend in the neutral territory of
Aburi in Ghana. Ojukwu's aides
were not without doubt. Some
warned him that the Aburi meeting
could be a trap set by anti-Igbo
members of the Federal
Government to arrest or kill him.
Ojukwu brushed aside their
concerns by pointing out that he
had received a guarantee of safe
passage from Lt-Colonel Gowon,
and that he had to trust Gowon's
word as an officer and a
gentleman. Virtually everything
discussed at that Aburi conference
is relevant till today. So much so
that a reader would be tempted to
believe that the discussion was on
Nigeria's current problems, rather
than over 40 years earlier, in 1967.
It is probably the best recorded
constitutional debate in history.
Aware that something momentous
was occurring, the Ghanaians had
the conference tape recorded. The
tape of the discussions was later
released by Ojukwu as a series of
six long playing gramophone
records. In attendance on the
Federal Military Government (FMG)
side were:
NAME POSITION
Lt-Colonel
Yakubu Gowon
Head of the
SMC*

>>Commodore
Joseph Edet

>>Akinwale Wey
Head of the
Nigerian navy

>>Colonel Robert
Adeyinka
Adebayo
Military
Governor of
the western
region

>>Lt-Colonel
Hassan Usman
Katsina
Military
Governor of
the northern
region
>>Lt-Colonel
David Akpode
Ejoor
Governor of
mid-west
region
>>Major Mobolaji
Johnson
Military
Governor of
Lagos
>>Alhaji Kam
Selem Inspector-
General of
Police

>>Timothy Omo-
Bare
Police
*Head of the SMC as Ironsi’s
whereabouts were “unknown”.
Ojukwu was in attendance as the
eastern region's Military Governor.
The FMG delegation arrived
"wreathed in smiles" [1] and anxious
to mollify their former brother-in-
arms Ojukwu. Colonels Adebayo
and Gowon even offered to
embrace Ojukwu. However Ojukwu
was still stung by the terrible
massacres of his Igbo kinsmen in
northern Nigeria the previous year
and was in no mood to embrace
his former colleagues. The contrast
in the demeanour of the
participants was in itself a
microcosm of what took place over
the course of the next two days.
While the federal delegation
behaved as if the Aburi conference
was a social gathering to reunite
former friends who had fallen out in
a social tiff, Ojukwu saw the
conference for what it really was: a
historic constitutional debate that
would determine Nigeria's future
social and political structure.
Typically, western perspective was
focused on image, rather than on
the genuine problems of the
protagonists. Secret diplomatic
dispatches later declassified by the
United States State Department
depicted the FMG-eastern region
stand-off as a personality clash
between Ojukwu and Gowon.
According to the American
perspective: "many Americans
admire Ojukwu. We like romantic
leaders, and Ojukwu has panache,
quick intelligence and an actor's
voice and fluency. The contrast
with Gowon - troubled by the
enormity of his task, painfully
earnest and slow to react, hesitant
and repetitive in speech - led some
Americans to view the Nigerian-
Biafran conflict as a personal duel
between two mismatched
individuals" . [2] As they were busy
fighting in Vietnam and fighting a
"cold war" against the USSR, the
Americans did not become militarily
or politically involved in the
dispute. Instead, treating the
conflict as one falling within
Britain's sphere of influence.
THE REUNION
The Ghanaian host Lt-General
Ankrah made a few introductory
remarks and reminded his guests
that "the whole world is looking up
to you as military men and of there
is any failure to reunify or even
bring perfect understanding to
Nigeria as a whole, you will find
that the blame will rest with us
through the centuries" . Ankrah
added that although he understood
that the eastern region/rest of
Nigeria stand-off was an internal
matter for Nigerians, they should
not hesitate to ask him for any help
should they feel the need. Although
Commodore Wey played an
avuncular role, the discussion
revolved around the younger
Colonels: Adebayo, Ejoor, Katsina,
Ojukwu and Gowon. Ojukwu
showed from the beginning that he
was prepared for serious business.
He arrived at the conference armed
with notes, and an army of
secretaries. The extent of Ojukwu’s
pre-preparation is shown by the
fact that he gave the other
debaters copies of documents he
had prepared in advance, which
enunciated his ideas. The other
debaters should have realised at
this point, that something serious
was going to occur. After the
hostility and bitterness that
preceded the Aburi meeting, the
civilian observers were stunned at
the camaraderie displayed by the
military officers. The debaters
threw off formality and addressed
each other by their first names:
"Emeka", "Bolaji", "Jack" (nickname
of Lt-Colonel Gowon) were thrown
around as if addressing each other
in at a social gathering. One of
Ojukwu’s secretaries was amazed
to observe that “the meeting went
on in a most friendly and cordial
atmosphere which made us, the
non-military advisers, develop a
genuine respect and admiration for
the military men and their sense of
comradeship. The meeting
continued so smoothly and ended
so successfully…..that I for one,
was convinced that among
themselves, the military had their
own methods”. [3]
Ojukwu decided to show his good
faith, and to test the good faith of
the others by asking all present to
renounce the use of force to settle
the crisis. Ojukwu's motion was
accepted without objection. While
this request by Ojukwu may sound
very noble, he was in fact playing a
cunning soldier-politician. Ojukwu
(despite his boasts of the eastern
region's military prowess) realised
that he could not succeed in a
military campaign against the far
more heavily armed FMG. By
getting them to renounce the use of
force, Ojukwu was trying to negate
the FMG's military advantage. For
he knew that if the political
situation eventually got out of
control, the FMG would find it
difficult to resort to a military
campaign having already given their
word that they would not use force.
This may have been an influential
factor in Gowon's subsequent
reluctance to engage the eastern
region in a fully fledged war.
POLITICIANS
The assembled military officers
struck a chord in unison on the
subject of politicians. All of them
voiced their contempt for the
behaviour of civilian politicians
whom they blamed for the
wholesale bloodletting of the
previous years (ignoring the fact
that more Nigerian civilians had
been murdered by politically
motivated violence, in the one year
of military rule so far, than in the
preceding five years of civilian
democratic rule). Commodore Wey
slammed the point home rather
forcefully when he declared that
"Candidly if there had ever been a
time in my life when I thought
somebody had hurt me sufficiently
for me to wish to kill him it was
when one of these fellows
[politicians] opened his mouth too
wide" .
IRONSI’S FATE
Despite Ironsi’s murder six months
earlier, no public announcement
regarding his death had been made
and his whereabouts were still
presumed unknown, although most
of the SMC definitely knew he was
dead. Gowon’s regime had eerily
repeated the mistake made by
Ironsi himself: failing to publicly
acknowledge the army officers
killed in a coup d’etat. By not
announcing Ironsi’s death, Gowon
also made his own position
tenuous and gave Ojukwu the
opportunity to reason that since the
Supreme Commander Ironsi was
“missing”, only the officer directly
behind Ironsi in army seniority
could replace him as Supreme
Commander. Major Mobolaji
Johnson encapsulated the issue
that the east was steadfastly
refusing to recognize Gowon as
Head of State while the other
regions accepted him (albeit
tentatively in the case of the west):
“The main problem now is that as
far as the east is concerned, there
is no central government. Why?
This is what we must find out.
…..For all the east knows the
former Supreme Commander
[Ironsi] is only missing and until
such a time that they know his
whereabouts they do not know any
other Supreme Commander. These
are the points that have been
brought out by the east.” Ojukwu
demanded that Gowon make a
categorical public statement on the
fate of Ironsi. Ejoor supported this
by flatly requesting “we want to
know what happened to Ironsi and
Fajuyi” . Despite Ojukwu’s request
for an announcement, most, if not
all the participants already knew
that Ironsi had been murdered.
Gowon was informed of the death
of Ironsi and Fajuyi not long after
they had been killed. Gowon’s ADC
Lt William Walbe was one of the
junior northern soldiers that led
Ironsi and Fajuyi into a bush
alongside Iwo road outside Ibadan
and murdered them there. Colonel
Adebayo had ordered a search for
their bodies, which were eventually
discovered by the police. The head
of the police Kam Selem would
have been informed when his men
discovered the bodies. Although
Ojukwu was several hundred miles
away in the east when Ironsi and
Fajuyi were murdered, he likely
would have had the story of their
death relayed to him by one of
Ironsi’s ADCs Captain Andrew
Nwankwo who was captured along
with Ironsi and Fajuyi but managed
to escape moments before they
were shot. Nwankwo eventually
managed to find his way back to
the east. Commodore Wey
acknowledged that all the debaters
already knew what happened to
Ironsi. Ojukwu simply wanted
Gowon to publicly acknowledge
what the SMC members already
knew: that Ironsi was dead.
Ojukwu later acknowledged that “I
heard the rumour that he [Ironsi]
had been assassinated, so I began
making contacts because I wanted
to force them out in the open so
that we could start dealing with the
real situation.” [4] Gowon agreed to
make a public announcement, and
Kam Selem concurred, although he
counselled that “the statement
should be made in Nigeria so that
the necessary honour can be
given”.
After the soldiers agreed to make a
public statement formally
announcing Ironsi’s death shortly
after they returned to Nigeria, the
microphones were switched off and
the civilians were asked to leave
the room. Gowon then narrated the
grisly tale of how Ironsi and Fajuyi
had been abducted from State
House in Ibadan by junior northern
soldiers (including Gowon’s ADC Lt
Walbe), driven out to an isolated
bush outside Ibadan and shot
there.
COUP PLOTTERS: OJUKWU'S
PROPHECY
When Ojukwu expressed his disgust
over the murder of Igbo army
officers by their northern colleagues
in July 1966, Lt-Colonel Katsina
interjected by asking Ojukwu why
he had not reacted with the same
revulsion when senior northern
military officers were murdered by
Igbo soldiers seven months earlier.
Ojukwu reasoned that in January
1966, soldiers from every region of
the federation (Nzeogwu: Mid-
West, Ifeajuna-East, Ademoyega:
West, Kpera: North) had staged a
coup in which soldiers and
politicians from every region of the
federation (Akintola: West, Balewa:
North, Unegbe: East, Okotie-Eboh:
Mid-West) were also killed.
Whereas when northern soldiers
staged a revenge coup in July,
soldiers from one region of the
federation only (North: Danjuma,
Murtala, Martin Adamu et al)
singled out soldiers from one region
in the federation as their targets
(East: Okoro, Ironsi etc). Katsina
took this opportunity to remind
Ojukwu of the effort he had put in
to prevent the murder of Igbos.
Katsina told Ojukwu that "If you
know how much …we have tried to
console the people to stop all these
movements and mass killings, you
will give me and others a medal
tonight."
Despite agreeing to attend the
conference, Ojukwu was still
refusing to recognize Lt-Colonel
Gowon as Nigeria's Head of State.
Ojukwu had defiantly continued to
address Gowon as the "the Chief of
Staff (Army)" (the post which
Gowon occupied before the July
counter-coup) in his public
statements. Ojukwu was alarmed at
the ascension of Gowon to the
highest office in the land despite
the presence of several other
officers who were more senior than
him (Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe,
Commodore J.E.A. Wey, Colonel
Adebayo, Lt-Colonels Hilary Njoku,
Phillip Effiong, George Kurubo, Ime
Imo, Conrad Nwawo and Lt-
Colonels Ejoor and Ojukwu who
were promoted to Lt-Colonel in the
same week as Gowon). Ojukwu
almost prophetically warned that
allowing a middle ranking officer
backed by coup plotters to become
the Head of State irrespective of
seniority would create a dangerous
precedent which Nigeria would find
difficult to emerge from. He told
Gowon that "any break at this time
from our normal line would write in
something into the Nigerian army
which is bigger than all of us and
that thing is indiscipline.....How
can you ride above people's heads
purely because you are at the head
of a group who have their fingers
poised on the trigger? If you do it
you remain forever a living example
of that indiscipline which we want
to get rid of because tomorrow a
Corporal will think....he could just
take over the company from the
Major commanding the company…" .
Ojukwu's warning was of course
not heeded and his prediction that
junior officers would in future
overthrow their superior officers
proved prophetic. The NCOs and
Lieutenants that shot Gowon to
power graduated into the Colonels
that overthrew him exactly nine
years later. As Brigadiers, they
overthrew the elected civilian
government of Shehu Shagari on
the last day of 1983, and removed
Major-General Buhari from power in
1985. Ojukwu's impassioned
monologue at Aburi could serve as
an anti coup plotter thesis. He
continued to Gowon "you
announced yourself as Supreme
Commander. Now, Supreme
Commander by virtue of the fact
that you head or that you are
acceptable to people who had
mutinied against their commander,
kidnapped him and taken him
away? By virtue of the support of
officers and men who had in the
dead of night murdered their
brother officers, by virtue of the
fact that you stood at the head of a
group who had turned their brother
officers from the eastern region out
of the barracks they shared?" .
THE STAR OF THE SHOW
It was obvious to the non military
observers of the Aburi conference
that Ojukwu "was clearly the star
performer. Everyone wanted to
please and concede to him" .[5] On
the federal side, only the Military
Governor of the Northern Region:
Lt-Colonel Hassan Usman Katsina,
seemed to realize the significance
of what was going on. Anxious not
to allow Ojukwu's domination of
the proceedings to continue for too
long, he at one point dared Ojukwu
to "secede, and let the three of us
(West, North, Mid-West) join
together" . Alarmed by talk of a
possible break-up of Nigeria,
Ankrah quickly interjected and told
his guests that "There is no
question of secession when you
come here [Ghana]" . Although the
FMG delegation was keen to mollify
and make concessions to Ojukwu,
Lt-Colonel Katsina was blunter
than his other colleagues. He
declared matter of factly to Ojukwu:
"You command the east, if you
want to come into Nigeria, come
into Nigeria and that is that" .
THE CONSTIUTIONAL DEBATE
Back then as now, each region of
Nigeria was petrified of domination
by other regions. No region of the
federation was keen to adopt a
course which would concentrate
too much power at the hands of
Nigeria's central government. Even
Gowon acknowledged this (and
unwittingly played into Ojukwu's
hands) by admitting that he would
"I would do away with any decree
that certainly tended to go towards
too much centralisation" . Ojukwu
pounced on the central powers
theme and remarked that
"Centralisation is a word that
stinks in Nigeria today. For that
10,000 people have been
killed” (this figure was later revised
up to 30,000, and then 50,000).
The clash, and ill defined
relationship between Nigeria's
central and regional governments
has been the greatest source of
political bloodletting in the
country's history. It led indirectly
to the gruesome "religious" clashes
that resulted in the deaths of
thousands of innocent civilians over
the introduction of Sharia law in
some northern states in 2000. It led
to the civil war in which over a
million civilians died. It led to the
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa after
he agitated for greater self
determination for his Ogoni people.
Using his "skilful histrionics and
superior intellectual adroitness" , [6]
Ojukwu managed to get the other
Colonels to understand, and share
his reasoning: that in order to keep
Nigeria together as one nation, its
constituent regions first had to
move a little further apart from
each other. Ojukwu used a
metaphor to explain his reasoning:
“It is better that we move slightly
apart and survive, it is much worse
that we move closer and perish in
the collision.” This may have been
a paradox, but the Colonels
accepted the logic of Ojukwu's
argument. The problem then (as it
still is in Nigeria today) is that
Nigeria is so large, diverse and
unwieldy that it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to find a
leader who can elicit popularity and
a following throughout, or most of
the country. Amazingly Gowon
accepted Ojukwu's thesis without
really understanding the
constitutional implications of what
he was agreeing to. Gowon was
effectively sanctioning measures
which would paralyse his own
powers. Lt-Colonel Katsina and
Colonel Adebayo also agreed and
were attracted to the concept of
regional autonomy. Adebayo
agreed so enthusiastically that he
advocated a “repeal [of] those
Decrees that were passed after
15 th January, 1966 but I think we
should revert to what the country
was as at 14th January, 1966, that
is regional autonomy” . Ojukwu
envisaged a titular Head of State
that would act only with the
concurrence of the various regional
governments: "what I envisage that
whoever is at the top is a
constitutional chap - constitutional
within the context of the military
government. That is, he is a titular
head, but he would only act where,
say when we have met and taken a
decision" . Having got what he
wanted Ojukwu was not content
with the agreement to be an oral
one (even though it had been
taped). He insisted that “we must
write it down in our decisions quite
categorically that the legislative
and executive authority of the
Federal Military Government shall
be vested in the Supreme Military
Council because previously it had
been vested in the Supreme
Commander”. The reason for this
nuanced request from Ojukwu is
that Gowon was now the Supreme
Commander. By vesting official
authority in the SMC (of which
Ojukwu was a member) rather than
the Supreme Commander Gowon,
Ojukwu could ensure that no official
decisions could be taken without
his consent. To signify the limited
powers that would be exercised by
the Head of State envisaged,
Ojukwu proposed that the diluted
phrase "Commander-in-Chief"
should be used to address the
Head of State as opposed to
"Supreme Commander" (a phrase
signifying immense power). The
title "Commander-in-Chief" has
been employed by every Nigerian
Head of State subsequent to Aburi.
While the other delegates arrived at
Aburi with a simple, but
unformulated idea that somehow,
Nigeria must stay together,
"Ojukwu was the only participant
who knew what he wanted, and he
secured the signatures of the SMC
to documents which would have
had the effect of turning Nigeria
into little more than a customs
union" .[7] Ojukwu managed to get
virtually everything he wanted, and
was so pleased by his success that
he even declared that he would
serve under Gowon if he (Gowon)
kept to the agreements reached. At
that point, Gowon arose from his
table position and embraced
Ojukwu.
The fulcrum of the agreement at
Aburi was that each region would
be responsible for its own affairs,
and that the FMG would be
responsible for matters that
affected the entire country: a
simple enough concept. Afterwards
the officers toasted their
reconciliation and agreement with
champagne. The federal
delegation's jubilation was such
that on his plane flight home,
Ojukwu asked one of his secretaries
whether the federal delegation had
fully understood the implications of
what had been agreed. Hindsight
tells us that no one at Aburi (other
than Ojukwu) really understood the
constitutional implications of what
had been agreed. Ojukwu was
obviously delighted with this -
hence why he was in such a hurry
to implement the decisions taken,
and why the Federal Government
had to renege on them. Some have
argued that Ojukwu took the SMC
for a ride by using his superior
intelligence to trap the SMC officers
into an agreement they did not
understand. Ojukwu was engaged
in a constitutional debate by
himself against five military officers,
and two police officers, yet still got
his way. He can hardly be faulted
for outwitting opponents that
outnumbered him by seven to one.
Questions might be asked of the
other SMC members of greater
numerical strength who allowed
Ojukwu to extract such substantial
concessions from them.
A CONSTITUTION IN WAITING
By failing to implement the Aburi
decisions, Nigeria missed a golden
opportunity to find a constitutional
arrangement acceptable to all of its
constituent parts. Had even half of
the Aburi accords being ratified,
Nigeria may have saved itself a
substantial amount of the
subsequent bloodshed that ensued
over the next four decades. It is a
sad commentary on the lack of
progress that Nigeria has made
since Aburi that the issues
discussed then (over 40 years ago
years ago) are still being argued
over today. Back in 1967, the Aburi
decisions were not implemented for
one primary reason: oil. Nigeria's
greedy power brokers did not want
a loose constitutional arrangement
that would deprive them of the vast
revenues which Nigeria earns from
its crude oil exports. Hence Nigeria
is glued together under a powerful
central government of a type more
suitable to a country with
contiguous ethnicity. Nigeria is
quite simply too large, too diverse,
and too fractious a country to have
an all powerful central government
of the type it has today. Across
Nigeria, there are groups agitating
for greater devolvement of federal
power to the regions. Although the
mantra of these groups is
"restructuring" of the Nigerian
federation - what they really intend
is what Ojukwu wanted to achieve
at the Aburi conference in 1967: a
constitutional arrangement that
would devolve so much power to
the regions that the entity known
as Nigeria would exist in name
only.
Rather than engaging in another
constitutional drafting/conference
exercise at which will waste more
taxpayers' money, and serve as a
means for corrupt "big men" to get
even richer, Nigeria would do well
to dip into its archives and review
the transcript of the debate at Aburi
which is gathering dust in the
national archives. The debate
transcript is sufficiently detailed to
serve as a constitution in waiting.
To learn from the debates and
mistakes of the past may ensure a
better future for Nigeria. What
Nigeria needs is a "constitutional
chap" of the type envisaged by
Ojukwu back at Aburi. As Ojukwu
said “It is better that we move
slightly apart and survive, it is
much worse that we move closer
and perish in the collision.”

*The above article is an extract
from a forthcoming book by the
author.